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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Defendant, Barbara Ann Ebbert, asserts that the deci-
sions of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court were 
correctly decided, and that neither decision presents any issues 
warranting the attention of this Court* Therefore, defendant 
will respond to plaintiff's questions presented, rather than for-
mulating her own questions for review. 
UTAH COURT OF APPEAL'S OPINION 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in Ebbert v. 
Ebbert, Case No. 860229-CA dated November 3, 1987 appears as 
addendum 1 annexed to plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
("Petition"). 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Defendant acknowledges that this Court has jurisdiction 
over plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory and other provisions are set 
forth in addendum 1 annexed hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a divorce decree rendered by the 
Honorable Phillip R. Fishier, former judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on June 10, 
1985. (Record, hereinafter "R." 2-11). Defendant answered and 
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counterclaimed and trial was held on March 27, 1986. (R. 12-17) 
The trial court ordered custody of children to the defendant in 
accordance with the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's 
answer and counterclaim. (R. 328-345). The defendant was ordered 
to pay child support and nominal alimony. (R. 330). The marital 
property was divided and the plaintiff was given specific visita-
tion rights. (R. 329-342). 
Plaintiff moved for a new trial on May 27, 1986 on the 
issues of child support, child custody and property division. 
(R. 276-77). The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial after hearing on July 1, 1986. (R. 284, 364-384). There-
after, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (R. 289-90). 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
findings and conclusions concerning custody, child support and 
marital property division, but reversed and remanded the decision 
with regard to visitation rights. Defendant does not appeal the 
Court of Appeal's decision on visitation. On appeal the plain-
tiff claimed that the trial court was biased, but the Court of 
Appeals held that the plaintiff had waived review of this issue 
by failing to present evidence at trial concerning bias and by 
failing to object to the trial court1s alleged expressions of bias. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in June of 1976. They are 
the parents of two daughters ages 7 and 5. On June 11, 1985 
the plaintiff filed for a divorce. (R. 2). In his complaint 
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plaintiff pleaded that custody of the children be awarded to the 
defendant and that he be awarded extensive visitation rights. 
(R. 2-11). Defendant answered and counterclaimed also requesting 
custody of the children with reasonable visitation to the plain-
tiff. (R. 12-17). In September, 1985 defendant informed the 
plaintiff that she was planning to move to Colorado. (R. 578). 
On November 8, 1985 the case was tentatively settled and 
the parties presented to the Court a proposed stipulated settle-
ment under which the defendant would be awarded custody of the 
children. (R. 315-326). The Court accepted the stipulation and 
heard evidence on grounds, jurisdiction, and the defendant's 
parental fitness, but the parties were thereafter unable to agree 
upon form and substance of the findings and decree. (R. 165-68, 
205, 312). Both parties drafted numerous versions of stipulated 
settlements and decrees and each draft thereof, including plain-
tiff's drafts, placed the children in the custody of the defendant. 
(R. 101,116; 141-43, 154). The trial court therefore set aside 
the stipulated settlement and trial was held on March 27, 1986. 
On the day of trial the court met with counsel in cham-
bers (not recorded) and at the commencement of trial stated 
without objection that the issues of jurisdiction, grounds and 
custody had been previously ruled upon. (R. 406). During the 
trial plaintiff attempted to amend his pleadings and seek custody 
of the children. (R. 620). The trial court denied the motion to 
amend citing concerns over the plaintiff's advanced notice of the 
issue, his failure to move to amend before trial, and the delay 
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that amendment would cause. (R. 621). Later during the trial, 
the plaintiff testified that the defendant had physically abused 
the children and that he should therefore have custody. (R. 
624). The trial court then offered to suspend the proceedings an 
order and independent custody evaluation. (R. 625). The plain-
tiff, after consulting with counsel, declined the court's offer 
and instead retracted his statements related to custody issues. 
(R. 625). 
In its final decree the court granted a divorce, awarded 
custody of the two children to the defendant, ordered the plain-
tiff to pay $325 per child per month in child support based on 
plaintiff's after-tax income of at least $24,000 per year, 
awarded the defendant nominal alimony for two years, established 
a visitation schedule, and divided the marital assets and debts. 
(R. 329; 587; 332-42; 241-54; 256-57). The court filed its fin-
dings, conclusions, judgement and decree on May 16, 1986. 
Plaintiff thereafter moved for a new trial seeking joint child 
custody which was denied (R. 277), and then appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT: SEASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 
I. 
PLAINTIFFfS ALLEGATION THAT HE LOST CUSTODY OF HIS CHILDREN 
THROUGH PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES IS WITHOUT SUBSTANCE, 
AND FAILS TO PRESENT AN ISSUE MERITING REVIEW BY THIS COURT 
Plaintiff's claims that he lost custody of his children 
without a hearing, based upon an unexecuted stipulation and 
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because the trial court improperly refused to allow him to amend 
his complaint were adequately considered by the Court of Appeals 
and unanimously rejected. They do not merit further review by 
this Court. Shorn of all rethoric and in light of the record, 
plaintiff's claim of procedural impropriety reduces itself to one 
essential allegation: a father in a divorce action is entitled 
to have the appellate court's review the grant of child custody 
to the mother notwithstanding that the father affirmatively 
prayed for such a result in his complaint. 
The simple answer to plaintiff's claim of procedural 
error is that the parties are bound by admissions in their 
pleadings and statements made at trial. Here, the plaintiff 
received what he asked for in his complaint: both children in 
the custody of their mother. No procedural impropriety occurred 
at trial or before the Court of Appeals. 
The plaintiff argues that the trial court should have 
permitted him to amend his complaint and seek custody of the 
children pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
During trial the plaintiff moved to amend his pleadings to ask 
for custody of the children claiming that the defendant's planned 
move to Colorado altered his position on custody. The trial 
court denied the motion because the plaintiff had notice months 
before trial of the defendant's plans to move to Colorado. The 
Court of Appeals amply addressed that issue and correctly applied 
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984), which expli-
citly holds that where a party has notice in advance of trial of 
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an issue that may be litigated, it is not an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to deny a motion to amend the pleadings. The 
facts below clearly came within Stratford, and this Court does 
not need to re-examine the firmly established rule last articu-
lated in 1984. 
Here, however, the plaintiff did more than simply fail 
to move to amend his pleadings within a reasonable time before 
trial. While testifying, plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
was an unfit mother, in contrast to his complaint. The trial 
court immediately inquired of the plaintiff concerning his testi-
mony and offered to suspend the proceedings and order a custody 
evaluation. The plaintiff, after consulting in private with 
counsel, expressly declined the trial court's offer to make 
custody an issue. 
Plaintiff's citations of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636 (1975), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), 
(Petition p. 10) are wholly inapposite to the facts below. 
Plaintiff cites the cases implying his children were taken from 
him without an adequate hearing. In the case at bar, the father 
pleaded that the mother should have custody of both children and 
then expressly declined the court's invitation to inject custody 
as an issue at trial. Stanley v. Illinois held that an Illinois 
statute violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
where an unwed father was denied a hearing on his parental fit-
ness before his putative children were taken from him after the 
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death of their mother. The case concerns presumptions of paren-
tal fitness of unwed fathers and has nothing to do with knowing 
and intentional waiver of custodial rights made in open court as 
here. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld held that sex-based distinctions 
in social security benefits violated the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the Fifth Amendment and has no relevance to 
the facts at issue here. 
Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeals based its 
decision on a stipulation that was never executed by the parties, 
and relies upon Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987), as 
authority that unsigned stipulations may not serve to bind par-
ties to the settlement of a law suit. Plaintiff grossly distorts 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals which clearly and correctly 
acknowledges that the stipulated settlements between the parties 
were never executed and that the trial court never entered 
judgment based on the stipulations. The Court of Appeals opinion 
states: 
The [trial] court accepted the stipulated 
settlement and heard evidence on grounds and 
jurisdiction. The parties were thereafter 
unable to agree upon the form and substance of 
the findings, conclusions, judgment, and 
decree. Consequently, the trial court set 
aside the stipulation and set the matter for 
trial on March 27, 1986. 
(Petition, Addendum 1, p. 1). 
The Court further states: 
Both by pleading and stipulation, the parties 
agreed custody should be awarded to defendant. 
Although the parties were unable to agree on 
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proposed findings, conclusions, judgments, and 
decrees, each draft thereof would have awarded 
custody to defendant. 
Id. at 3. 
Plaintiff necessarily misstates the Court of Appeals 
holding because he realizes an accurate reading of the decision 
raises no appealable issues of any sort. The Court of Appeals 
never held that an unsigned stipulation served to bind the plain-
tiff. It held that the plaintiff's complaint, his failure to 
amend his pleading before trial and his own testimony acted as a 
waiver of trial of the custody issue. The Court of Appeals1 men-
tion of the unsigned stipulations drafted by plaintiff's counsel 
which all placed the children in the custody of their mother 
relates to the evidence supporting the plaintiff's consistent 
position that the defendant was a proper custodial parent. 
II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION HOLDING THAT 
A FATHER CANNOT EVADE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
BY IMPUTING THE WEALTH OF THE MOTHER'S PARENTS 
TO THE MOTHER AND THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DIVIDING THE MARITAL PROPERTY 
DOES NOT RAISE AN ISSUE WARRANTING 
FURTHER REVIEW BY THIS COURT 
Plaintiff's claim that the Utah Court of Appeal's deci-
sion improperly limits the income to be considered in determining 
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child support and his claims that parental wealth can be attri-
buted to the defendant in determining support are wholly without 
merit. Despite his self-serving denials, plaintiff's theory is 
that because the defendant's parents occasionally provided her 
with gifts those gifts should be treated as part of the defen-
dant's income—thereby reducing or eliminating plaintiff's sup-
port obligation. (Petition pp. 15-18). 
Plaintiff attempts to argue that Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), and Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
1980), stand for the proposition that a father's duty of support 
should be reduced if the mother's parents are wealthy. Neither 
case even hints at such a principle, and the Court of Appeals 
properly rejected plaintiff's ridiculous theory. This Court has 
squarely held that the appellant bears the burden of proving that 
the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of 
child support. McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 
1979); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359,1360 (Utah 1974), and 
that well recognized principle does not need to be re-enunciated 
by this Court. Certainly no departure from existing precedent 
occurs when an intermediate appellate court affirms a trial 
court's finding that a father earning more than $2,000 net per 
month can afford to pay child support of $325 per month per child 
for his two daughters. (Petition, Addendum 1, p. 5). The trial 
court's finding was well grounded in fact and law and no abuse of 
discretion occurred. 
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Plaintiff also asserts that the Court of Appeals ignored 
his allegations of error by the trial court in dividing the mari-
tal property. Plaintiff frames the issue for review as whether 
it is "an abuse of discretion to award 97% of the marital pro-
perty to one party....1' (Petition p. 17). Plaintiff disingen-
uously knocks over the straw man he has erected. Similar 
arguments were made before the Court of Appeals and plaintiff's 
arguments here are well-plowed ground. The facts below showed 
that the trial court's division of marital assets was roughly 
equivalent and not approaching the figures represented by the 
plaintiff. (R. 412, 555-57, 244-46). Plaintiff cannot show that 
the values assigned to the marital property by the trial court 
were a clear abuse of discretion as required under precedents of 
this Court. See King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-716 (Utah 1986); 
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982), and the Court of 
Appeals so held. (Petition Addendum 1, p. 6) Plaintiff's spurious 
claims that defendant received 97 percent of the marital assets 
are the product of indecipherable arithmetic that do not deserve 
the attention of this Court. 
III. 
THE APPLICATION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MEIER V. CHRISTENSEN, AND PILCHER V. 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
IS CORRECT AND DOES NOT DESERVE FURTHER REVIEW 
Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals improperly 
failed to consider the issue of judicial bias even though the 
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plaintiff failed to object to trial to the courtfs alleged biased 
conduct, and failed to move under U.R.C.P. 63(b) to disqualify 
the judge. (Petition p. 18-19) Plaintiffs desperate allegation 
of bias was rejected by the Court of Appeals because the plain-
tiff failed to preserve appellate review of the issue by objec-
tion or presentation of evidence. This Court has repeatedly held 
that matters not raised at trial will not be considered on 
appeal. Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 
450, 453 (Utah 1983); see also Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430, 433 
(1970). Here, the defendant and his trial attorney filed affida-
vits with their brief to the Court of Appeals claiming bias by 
the trial court. (Brief of Appellant No. 860229 CA, Addenda 1, 
p. 2). Meier v. Christensen, 389 P.2d 734 (1964), cited by the 
Court of Appeals, clearly applies to this situation where the 
plaintiff-appellant failed to object to the trial court's alleged 
expressions of bias and thereby waived the issue for appeal. 
(Petition, Addendum 1, p. 6) Certainly, this Court does not need 
to reaffirm the principle that failing to object at trial waives 
appellate review of an issue. Few other principles of law are 
more firmly established. 
Finally, plaintiff's claim that a "mountain of research11 
(Petition p. 19) has been compiled regarding gender bias in the 
Utah courts is irrelevant. Plaintiff failed to raise gender bias 
at trial and that issue was never subject to adversarial testing 
that would make the issue proper for review on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this /T7A- day of January, 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
WILLIAM H. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Barbara Ann Ebbert 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless-the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any tune, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth^ur attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
1 
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge. 
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge 
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be 
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly 
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform 
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those 
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may 
in his discretion grant a new trial. 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil 
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge 
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite 
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the 
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against 
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to 
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the 
judge against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the legal suffi-
ciency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds 
that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the case or 
determine the matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to file 
more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompa-
nied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are 
made in good faith. 
